

Europe's Tech Sovereignty Push: AI, Chips, and Cross-Border Digital Diplomacy

Technology Diplomacy · Practice Test · 12 Questions

1. The EU's recent 'Tech Sovereignty Package', unveiled in June 2026, aims to bolster European self-sufficiency in key technology sectors. Which of the following legislative proposals is a core component of this package, specifically targeting cloud computing and artificial intelligence capabilities within the EU?

- A) The Digital Markets Act (DMA)
- B) The Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA)
- C) The Data Governance Act (DGA)
- D) The Cybersecurity Act

2. Europe's reliance on third countries for semiconductor manufacturing remains a significant concern, despite initiatives like the EU Chips Act. Which of the following countries is identified as a primary source for the EU's supply of ultra-pure silicon wafers, a critical component in semiconductor production?

- A) Taiwan
- B) South Korea
- C) United States
- D) Germany

3. The EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework (DPF), designed to govern transatlantic data flows, has faced numerous legal challenges. Which of the following courts has been central to invalidating previous data transfer frameworks between the EU and the U.S., and is currently reviewing the DPF's validity?

- A) The General Court of the European Union
- B) The European Court of Justice
- C) The International Court of Justice
- D) The European Court of Human Rights

4. In response to growing global demand for materials critical to green and digital transitions, the EU's Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) sets ambitious targets for domestic sourcing. By 2030, what percentage of its strategic raw material needs does the EU aim to extract domestically under the CRMA?

- A) 25%
- B) 10%
- C) 40%
- D) 65%

5. The Council of Europe's 'Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law,' adopted in May 2024, saw participation from several non-European countries. Which of the following nations was among the eleven non-European countries involved in its drafting?

- A) Brazil
- B) India
- C) Australia
- D) South Africa

6. The EU's strategy to bolster its quantum technology sector by 2030, outlined in its Quantum Europe Strategy, emphasizes collaboration with 'like-minded countries'. Which of the following is NOT listed as a priority partner for joint R&D programmes and reciprocal access to quantum infrastructures?

- A) United States
- B) Japan
- C) China
- D) Canada

7. The Tallinn Mechanism, launched in December 2023, is a framework designed to coordinate international assistance for Ukraine's cybersecurity resilience. How much international support has been mobilized through this mechanism for cybersecurity projects to date?

- A) EUR60 million
- B) EUR241.7 million
- C) EUR10 million
- D) EUR500 million

8. The EU's 'Tech Sovereignty Package' includes an initiative to strengthen its open-source ecosystem. What is one of the key objectives of this EU Open Source Strategy?

- A) To mandate proprietary software for all EU public administrations.
- B) To promote open and interoperable digital ecosystems for public administrations.
- C) To exclusively fund the development of closed-source European software.
- D) To restrict the use of open-source software in critical infrastructure.

9. The European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) aims to reduce the EU's dependency on single third-country suppliers. What is the target for the maximum percentage of any strategic raw material that should be supplied by a single country to the EU, according to the CRMA's political guidelines?

- A) 30%
- B) 75%
- C) 65%
- D) 50%

10. The EU's Space Strategy for Security and Defence emphasizes strengthening technological sovereignty. Which of the following is a key measure mentioned to achieve this in the space sector?

- A) Phasing out all international cooperation in space programs.
- B) Reducing strategic dependencies on third countries and boosting the resilience of critical industrial value chains.
- C) Privileging reliance on external satellite service providers for critical functions.
- D) Limiting the development of dual-use space technologies.

11. The EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement, approved in March 2026, has raised concerns regarding its potential impact on digital rights and oversight. What is a primary concern highlighted about this agreement?

- A) It excessively promotes protectionist measures for European digital companies.
- B) It strengthens privacy protections and data sovereignty for EU citizens.
- C) It weakens the EU's capacity to safeguard privacy and accountability over software systems.
- D) It mandates the use of open-source software for all cross-border digital transactions.

12. The EU's AI Act, finalized in May 2024 and with most rules applicable from August 2026, is the first comprehensive AI regulation of its kind. Beyond the EU's borders, what is a significant expected impact of the AI Act on global AI development and trade?

- A) It will exclusively lead to increased regulatory fragmentation worldwide.
- B) It is expected to have minimal impact on companies outside the EU.
- C) It has the potential to shape the future of AI regulation globally and influence international trade.
- D) It will encourage all countries to adopt a purely risk-based approach to AI without ethical considerations.